

(Translation)

Extracts from the memorandum, "EFFORTS FOR PEACE",
by AYAMARO KONOYE (pp. 3-5).

Meanwhile, Chiang Tso-Ping ~~in~~ the summer of 1935, if I remember correctly, returned home temporarily. This had an important significance, for Chiang Tso-Ping had been approaching me with a peace proposal between Japan and China since about the time I moved to Kamakura-yama. His going home had the purpose of formulating some concrete plans of peace in full consultation with Chiang Kai-shek.

At that time, Chiang Kai-shek was in Szechuan fighting the Reds. Chiang Tso-Ping went there to stay with him at Chunking for three weeks (or was it three months?) discussing peace problems. He sent Ting Shao-jen to Japan with the plans thus formulated. On arriving in Japan, Ting came to see me at Karuizawa.

The crude outline of the peace proposal which he brought to me was as follows:

1. The Manchurian problem will be laid aside for the time being (for it is impossible to discuss the matter in the present atmosphere in China).
2. The relations between Japan and China will be placed upon the basis of equality, and as a result all unequal treaties will be abolished, excepting those relating to Manchuria. Anti-Japanese education will be suppressed.
3. Japan and China will make economic cooperation based on equality and reciprocity.
4. Military agreement will be concluded depending upon the results of economic cooperation. (In the event of signing a military agreement, Chiang Kai-shek himself will not be reluctant to visit Japan.) Being heartily satisfied with this plan, I promised him to do my best for its realization.

Approving this Chinese proposal, I saw Foreign Minister Hirota in the Diet, informed him of the circumstances and asked him that the government should make efforts to solve the Sino-Japanese problem. While Hirota and the Foreign Office approved this proposal, opposition came from among the military. They objected to "laying aside the Manchurian problem" and insisted upon "recognition" which embarrassed Hirota.

Who was the War Minister at that time? If it was in the Diet session before the February 26th Incident in 1936, the Minister must have been Hayashi or Kawashima; and if it was after the formation of the Hirota Cabinet, it must have been Terauchi. I believe it was after the February 26th Incident.

Hearing that the military was opposed to the plan, Ting Shao-jen was bitterly disappointed and came to inform me of his decision to leave. Ting said, however, that he still had hopes and asked that in case this proposal should be taken up again in the future, Ryusuke Miyazaki, if a young man is suitable, or Teisuke Akiyama, if an older person is preferred, be sent to establish liaison between Japan and China; and he went home.

What he had in mind is that either Miyazaki or Akiyama can be regarded by Chiang Tso-Ping as one of his own, or, in other words, they were men who could enter China by the kitchen door.

Remembering Ting's words at this time, I tried to dispatch Miyazaki and Akiyama to Nanking upon the occurrence of the Lukouchiao Incident in July, 1937. They were detained by the military police on their way, Miyazaki at Kobe and Akiyama in Tokyo. Although I immediately made arrangements with the military, the military procrastinated their release for a week, and the Incident had spread and the opportunity was lost forever. The reason for the detention of these men by the military was claimed to be suspicion of espionage, a laughable nonsense.

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Certificate of Source

We hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written by KONOUE, Fumimaro personally, entitled "Efforts for Peace" is an exact and authorized excerpt (P.3. to P. 5) from the book which issued by Nippon Denpō Tsushin Sha, April 1, 1946

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近衛文磨手記「平和への努力」第三頁乃至第五頁より抜萃と題
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證明書

昭和二十二年一月一日

東京都京橋區銀座四七ノ一

日本電報通信社

近衛文磨手記「平和への努力」第三頁乃至第五頁より抜萃

一方蔣作賓は十年の夏だつたか、一先づ歸國した。これは重大な意味があつたのである。作賓は私が鎌倉山に引越した時分から日支和平案件といふものを持ちこんできてゐた。それを今度歸國して蔣介石に會ひ、充分談合して具体案を作つて来るといふことになつてゐたのである。

當時蔣介石は四川方面の赤軍討伐中であつたが、作賓はそこへ訪ねて行き、それから重慶に三週間だつたか、とに角一諸に居つて和平問題を練つた。そして出來上つた案を丁紹伊に持たせて日本に寄こした。丁は日本に着くと、早速輕井澤に私を訪ねて來た。

彼の携へて來た日支和平案といふのは、彼の携へて來た日支和平案といふのは

一、滿洲問題は當分の間不問に對する（現在の空氣では支那に於ては取あげられないから）

二、日支の關係を平等の基礎の上に置くその結果として凡ゆる不平等條約を撤廢する、但し滿洲に關係のある不平等條約は除外しない、又排日教育は防止する。

三、平等互惠の關係のもとに、日支經濟提携をなすこと。

四、經濟提携の成績を見たうへて軍事協定を結ぶ（軍事協定締結の場合には蔣介石自身は日本を訪問してもよいといふのである）。

大体右のやうな内容のものであつた。

私はこの案に大賛成であつたから充分努力しようと丁に書つたのである。この支那の提案を取あげた私は、議會で廣田外相に會ひ事情を話し、政府に於ても日支問題の解決につき努力するやう頼んだ。廣田も外務省も同感であつたが、軍部から反対の聲があつた。それは提案第一條の滿洲を一不間一に附するといふ點がいかん「承認」と改めよといふのである。これには廣田も困つた。この時の陸相は誰であつたか。昭和十一年の二、二六事件以前の議會なら林か川島であり、後の廣田内閣成立後いことなら、寺内である。私は二、二六事件のあとであつたやうに思つてゐる。軍部が反対と聞いて、丁紹楨はがつかりして丁ひ、いとま乞ひに私のところに見えた。しかし其折丁は自分はまだ希望を持つてゐる。今後この問題を取りあげる場合には、日支間の連絡としては日本人側からは若い所で宮崎龍介、年寄りなら秋山定輔この人達をよこしてくれと私に頼んで歸國した。宮崎や秋山なら蔣作賓も内の人として抜へる。つまり支那の台所口から入つて行ける人物であるといふ意味なのだ。

私はこの時の丁の言葉を覚えてゐたので、昭和十二年七月蘆溝橋事件が起ると同時に、宮崎秋山の両名を南京に派遣しようとした。ところが途中宮崎は神戸で、秋山は東京で憲兵に押へられて丁つた。こちらでもすぐ手配

したが釋放するといひ乍らぐづ
すること一週間そのうち事件は擴
大して終に時機を失して了つた。當時軍がこの兩名を押へたのは、兩
人に對しスパイの疑ひを持つてゐたといふのだから何ともお話になら
ない。